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rewards (Waltz and Gold, 2007; Gold et al., 2008; Heerey et al., 
2008; Waltz et al., 2009). Furthermore, several ﬁ  ndings of altered 
haemodynamic response patterns in patients with psychosis relative 
to healthy controls during reward processing have provided evi-
dence for the dysfunction of brain circuits innervated by dopamine 
(Jensen et al., 2008; Murray et al., 2008b).
To test Kapur’s hypothesis of aberrant salience attribution exper-
imentally, Roiser et al. (2009) used a novel paradigm designed to 
assess implicit and explicit reward learning relating to task-relevant 
and -irrelevant stimuli (Salience Attribution Test – SAT). They 
reported decreased “adaptive salience” (task-relevant reward learn-
ing) in medicated patients with schizophrenia, consistent with the 
above studies. Importantly, patients with delusions scored higher 
on the SAT measure of explicit “aberrant salience” (task-irrelevant 
reward learning) than those without such symptoms, consistent 
with the aberrant salience model. Furthermore, healthy control 
participants with high-schizotypy scores also showed less adap-
tive salience and more aberrant salience than low scorers, further 
supporting the model.
In some respects, the aberrant salience framework is not dis-
similar from an earlier cognitive model of psychosis proposed by 
Gray et al. (1991). These authors proposed that a core feature of 
psychosis is the malfunction of a “comparator” function, which 
acts continuously to compare current information processing with 
stored regularities or expectations. This model draws on empiri-
cal data from a number of studies utilising animal   associative 
INTRODUCTION
Salience can broadly be deﬁ  ned as “a process whereby objects and 
representations… [are] attention-grabbing and capture thought and 
behaviour” (Jensen and Kapur, 2009, p.197). Examples of situations 
where a stimulus might be considered salient include: feature con-
trast (e.g. a bright light ﬂ  ashing in a dark room); novelty (e.g. a new 
object in an otherwise familiar environment); and emotional/moti-
vational association (e.g. a previously neutral stimulus that has been 
paired with reward or punishment). Disrupted salience process-
ing has been proposed as central to explaining positive psychotic 
symptoms (Maher, 1974; Miller, 1976; Shaner, 1999). The ability 
to ignore irrelevant stimuli is reliably impaired in schizophrenia 
(Hemsley, 1993), though the exact mechanisms underpinning this 
deﬁ  cit remain unclear. However, it is possible that dopaminergic 
transmission, which is also abnormal in schizophrenia (Laruelle 
and Abi-Dargham, 1999), plays a crucial role in salience processing 
generally (Horvitz, 2000), though the evidence is strongest in the 
domain of motivational salience (Berridge and Robinson, 1998).
Kapur (2003), in an elegant attempt to create a framework 
explaining the symptoms and neurobiology of psychosis-
in-schizophrenia, suggested that stochastic ﬁ  ring of dopamine 
neurons (Seeman and Kapur, 2000) leads to the “aberrant” attri-
bution of salience via context-independent stimulus-reinforcement 
signalling (Berridge and Robinson, 1998). Patients with psychosis 
have indeed shown impairments on tests of reinforcement learn-
ing, particularly on measures that assess adaptive responses to 
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learning paradigms, for example latent inhibition (LI) and Kamin 
blocking (Solomon et al., 1981; Weiner et al., 1981, 1984; Baruch 
et al., 1988; Jones et al., 1992; Gray et al., 1995). LI refers to the 
retardation of learning an association between two stimuli after 
previous inconsequential (non-reinforced) preexposure of these 
stimuli. Related, learned irrelevance (LIrr) paradigms test a simi-
lar preexposure effect, which is thought to reﬂ  ect the ability to 
ignore irrelevant stimuli (e.g. Gal et al., 2005). Importantly, as has 
been hypothesised (but not as yet tested) for aberrant salience, 
LI/LIrr can be modulated pharmacologically by dopamine agonists 
and antagonists (e.g. Weiner et al., 1988; De la Casa et al., 1993), 
though the precise mechanisms by which this process is disrupted 
are less clear (e.g. Braunstein-Bercovitz and Lubow, 1998; Shrira 
and Tsakanikos, 2009).
While both the comparator and aberrant salience accounts 
of psychosis attempt to explain the generation of the positive 
symptoms of schizophrenia as a product of a disrupted central 
cognitive process, driven by dysregulated dopamine transmission, 
the cognitive concepts on which they are based are, at least super-
ﬁ  cially, dissimilar. The comparator model suggests a disruption 
in the “integration of past regularities of experience with current 
stimulus recognition, learning, and action” (Gray, 1998, p.249). 
By contrast the aberrant salience model speciﬁ  es a disruption 
of (motivational) salience attribution, resulting in the “aberrant 
assignment of salience to external objects and internal representa-
tions” (Kapur, 2003, p.15). A “prediction error” explanation of 
psychosis has also been proposed, which to some extent bridges 
the gap between these two accounts, suggesting that “inappropriate 
mismatch signals (i.e. prediction errors) are ultimately responsible 
for the perceptual aberrations, capture of attention and perception 
of inappropriate causal relationships that are characteristic of psy-
chosis” (Corlett et al., 2007, p.241). However, it remains unclear 
to what extent these models (and the paradigms used to test 
them) overlap.
In particular, critics have emphasised the potential overlap 
between the constructs of aberrant salience and LI (Gray, 2004). 
Indeed, evidence that acutely psychotic patients and individuals 
scoring high on measures of schizotypy show disrupted LI (Baruch 
et al., 1988; Gray et al., 1995; Braunstein-Bercovitz and Lubow, 
1998; Lubow and De la Casa, 2002; Vaitl et al., 2002; Braunstein-
Bercovitz, 2003; Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009) and LIrr (Gal et al., 
2005; Young et al., 2005; Orosz et al., 2008; Schmidt-Hansen et al., 
2009) should encourage caution in interpreting behavioural ﬁ  nd-
ings purporting to demonstrate impaired salience attribution 
processes in psychosis, since it is conceivable that such a deﬁ  cit 
might simply reﬂ  ect impaired LI. Similarly, the general cogni-
tive impairments characteristic of patients with schizophrenia 
(Robbins, 2005), might also confound the assessment of aber-
rant salience. For example, in order to perform the SAT, partici-
pants must be able to attend continuously for an extended period, 
use working memory, learn probabilistic associations and guide 
responses on the basis of such associations, all of which may be 
impaired in schizophrenia (Keri et al., 2000; Young et al., 2005; 
Waltz and Gold, 2007).
Therefore, we performed a factor analysis to assess the con-
struct validity of salience attribution measures derived from the 
SAT (Roiser et al., 2009). Our aim was to determine the extent to 
which the constructs of adaptive and aberrant salience   dissociate 
from other cognitive measures, most speciﬁ  cally LIrr, but also 
probabilistic learning/sensitivity, sustained attention, and working 
memory. In order to avoid the potential confound of the general 
cognitive impairment in schizophrenia, we tested a non-clinical 
sample, but recorded schizotypy, since individuals scoring higher on 
this personality trait exhibit similar cognitive impairments to those 
seen in schizophrenia (Gray et al., 2002; Bedwell et al., 2009) and are 
at elevated risk for developing psychosis (Claridge, 1994; Verdoux 
and van Os, 2002). We predicted the emergence of implicit aber-
rant salience, explicit aberrant salience and LIrr on independent 
factors, and that all three would show associations with schizotypy 
traits across individuals, as reported previously (Gray et al., 2002; 
Roiser et al., 2009).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-ﬁ  ve volunteers who reported an absence of previous psy-
chiatric or neurological disorders were recruited through online 
advertising and the University College London Psychology par-
ticipant pool. Inclusion criteria were: age (18–60 years); native 
or bilingual English speaker. Exclusion criteria were: previous or 
current neurological or psychiatric disorders; previous or cur-
rent substance/alcohol abuse/dependence, excepting a remote 
(>12 months) history of substance/alcohol abuse. Participants 
were compensated with a £10 baseline payment for their time 
and travel and had the opportunity to win up to £20 on study 
tasks if they cleared further screening measures. This study was 
approved by the Ealing and West London Mental Health Trust 
Research Ethics Committee and all participants provided written 
informed consent.
SCREENING AND DEMOGRAPHIC/PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT
The Mini International Neuropsychiatric Inventory (MINI; 
Sheehan et al., 1998) was administered to participants to conﬁ  rm 
the absence of DSM-IV axis-I psychiatric conditions, includ-
ing alcohol/substance abuse/dependence. Five participants were 
excluded based on this screen. Intelligence quotient (IQ) was 
assessed using the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; Wechsler, 
2001). To assess schizotypy, participants completed the short scales 
of the Oxford–Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences 
(O-LIFE; Mason et al., 2005). The O-LIFE consists of four subscales: 
Unusual Experiences (perceptual aberrations and magical think-
ing); Cognitive Disorganisation (poor attention, poor decision-
making, and social anxiety); Introvertive Anhedonia (avoidance 
of intimacy and lack of pleasure from social and physical stimuli); 
and Impulsive Nonconformity (impulsive and eccentric behaviour 
suggesting a lack of self-control).
COGNITIVE ASSESSMENT
Fifty participants completed the cognitive test battery described 
below. The order of administration was randomised across par-
ticipants. Participants had the opportunity to take breaks between 
measures and were able to win money on two of the tasks (the 
gambling task and the SAT). Three of the tests were available for use 
through the authors (Probabilistic reversal learning (PRL): Swainson 
et al., 2000, Choice × Risk gambling task: Rogers et al., 2003, SAT: Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 58  |  3
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Roiser et al., 2009), and two were replicated based on published 
descriptions (AX-Continuous Performance Test (AX-CPT): Cohen 
et al., 1999; LIrr: Orosz et al., 2008) using Cogent 2000 (http://www.
vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php; Matlab version 7.1, MathWorks).
Salience attribution test (SAT; Roiser et al., 2009)
The SAT (Roiser et al., 2009) aims to tap the attribution of salience 
to task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimuli. Participants pressed 
a key in response to a black square (the probe) after seeing one 
of several conditioned stimuli, which varied along two dimen-
sions (colour and shape). Probability of reinforcement (monetary 
reward) varied along one of these dimensions (the task-relevant 
dimension), but not the other (the task-irrelevant dimension). 
Participants’ response times (implicit) and visual analogue scale 
ratings (VAS; explicit) provided measures of adaptive (task-
  relevant) and aberrant (task-irrelevant) salience attribution. 
A practice session and two experimental sessions, with 64 trials 
each, were run. VAS ratings of reward probability were made at 
the end of each session.
Explicit adaptive salience was calculated as the increase in par-
ticipants’ VAS ratings of the probability of a stimulus to predict 
monetary reward for high-probability relative to low-probability 
stimuli. Explicit aberrant salience was calculated as the absolute 
difference in VAS rating between the two levels of the task- irrelevant 
dimension. Implicit adaptive salience was calculated as the speeding 
of responses on high-probability relative to low-probability trials. 
Implicit aberrant salience was deﬁ  ned as the absolute difference in 
reaction time between the two levels of the task-irrelevant stimu-
lus dimension (Roiser et al., 2009). Implicit and explicit measures 
of adaptive and aberrant salience measures were included in the 
factor analysis.
Learned irrelevance (LIrr; Orosz et al., 2008)
A within-subject LIrr task (Orosz et al., 2008) lasting approxi-
mately 7 min was administered to test for the relative retarda-
tion of associative learning following preexposure, as indexed 
by the speeding of responses to associations of non-preexposed 
(NPE) relative to preexposed (PE) stimuli with a target stimu-
lus. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as pos-
sible to a target letter during continuous sequential presentation 
of letters, which varied between presentation blocks containing 
PE, NPE, and random (R) letter cues preceding the target. LIrr is 
deﬁ  ned as the speeding of responses during the NPE relative to the 
PE conditions. A LIrr value greater than zero indicates successful 
LIrr, while a value around or below 0 is evidence for a disruption 
of LIrr (Orosz et al., 2008). The LIrr measure was included in the 
factor analysis.
Gambling task (Choice × Risk; Rogers et al., 2003)
This game taps into aspects of decision making based on the 
manipulation of reinforcement properties. Participants were 
presented with a forced-choice trial of two gambles, a control 
gamble (consisting of a 50% probability of winning, with the 
amounts to win or lose both at 10 points), and an experimental 
gamble (with varying probabilities of winning, and amounts 
to win or lose). The experimental gamble varied according to 
potential wins (80 or 20 points), losses (80 or 20 points), and 
the probability of winning (25% or 75%; Rogers et al., 2003). 
Participants were instructed to try to win as many points as 
possible (in this case corresponding to monetary reward) over 
four games consisting of 20 trials each. Measures of sensitivity 
to probability, wins and losses were calculated by comparing 
the proportion of experimental gambles chosen when the prob-
ability of winning, potential wins and losses were high relative 
to low, respectively. Sensitivity to probability was included in 
the factor analysis.
Probabilistic reversal learning (PRL; Rogers et al., 1999)
In the PRL task, participants responded by clicking on one of two 
abstract patterns (coloured either red of green) presented simulta-
neously in a forced-choice paradigm. Subjects learned to respond 
to the “correct” stimulus, which was reinforced 80% of the time, 
and avoid the “incorrect” stimulus, which was reinforced 20% of 
the time. Reinforcement consisted of either “correct” or “incorrect” 
being displayed on the computer screen, accompanied by a high- 
or low-frequency tone, respectively. The association between the 
stimuli and feedback was reversed after 40 trials (i.e. the previously 
high-reinforced stimulus became the low-reinforced stimulus). The 
number of errors during initial acquisition (Stage 1) and reversal 
(Stage 2) were calculated. An “error” was deﬁ  ned as the choice of 
the low-reinforced stimulus, regardless of the feedback given on 
that trial. The number of errors made during acquisition (Stage 1) 
was included in the factor analysis.
Continuous performance test (CPT; Cohen et al., 1999)
The AX-CPT tests participants’ ability to actively maintain context 
information in order to mediate behaviour accordingly (Cohen et 
al., 1999). Participants were required to respond to a target com-
bination of letters – “A” followed by “X” – while ignoring all other 
letter sequences. Individual letters were displayed sequentially and 
participants responded by pressing the space bar. Rates of inap-
propriate responses and the proportion of correct responses to 
target pairs were calculated (“A–X” letter sequences); the latter was 
included in the factor analysis.
Working memory (Digit Span; Wechsler, 1981)
Working memory was assessed using forward and backward digit 
span (Wechsler, 1981). Participants were required to listen to 
sequences of digits, read out loud, and then repeat the sequence 
back in either forward or reverse order. Sequences were presented 
in ascending order of difﬁ  culty, from 3 to 8 digits (forwards) 
and 2 to 7 digits (backwards). The total number of correctly 
repeated sequences in the forwards condition was included in the 
factor analysis.
ANALYSIS
Statistical analyses were carried out using the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences, version 16.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL., USA). 
Regardless of the transformations carried out for statistical analysis, 
raw values are presented in the text and tables for ease of interpre-
tation. The implicit and explicit aberrant salience variables from 
the SAT were square-root transformed. Stage 1 errors from the 
probabilistic reversal task were double-log transformed. The pro-
portion of correct responses   measure on the AX-CPT was   arcsin Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 58  |  4
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transformed. To ensure that  participants  performed as expected on 
the various tasks, t-tests were  performed on the outcome measures 
where appropriate (one-sample or related-samples).
Data were assessed for the adequacy of factor analytic methods. 
The R matrix showed satisfactory correlations between variables, with 
all included variables yielding at least one correlation with another 
above 0.3. While some variables showed fairly weak correlations with 
others, re-running the analysis without these yielded similar results 
to those reported below, justifying their retention. Bartlett’s test was 
highly signiﬁ  cant [χ2(45) = 87.65, p < 0.001], rejecting the possibility 
that variable correlations formed an identity matrix, and measures 
of sampling adequacy were sufﬁ  cient (KMO = 0.54).
The measures listed below, thought to be most reﬂ  ective of the 
constructs investigated, were standardised using z-scores (after 
transformation if appropriate) and entered into a principal com-
ponents analysis (PCA) with direct oblimin (delta = 0) oblique 
rotation. The variables entered included: implicit (reaction time) 
and explicit (VAS rating) measures of adaptive and aberrant sali-
ence; LIrr; sensitivity to probability (from the gambling task); per-
centage of hits to A–X (from the AX-CPT); Stage 1 errors from 
the PRL; working memory (forward digit span); and estimated 
IQ (WTAR). The number of variables was limited in order to 
perform a valid analysis with the sample size available. Oblique 
rotation was chosen on the premise that some the possible cor-
relations between constructs needed to be taken into account in 
the factor interpretation.
Solutions extracting two to eight components were examined. 
After inspection of the factor structures emerging with differ-
ent extraction and rotation methods, a ﬁ  ve-factor solution was 
chosen. Although Kaiser’s criterion for eigenvalues (>1.0) ini-
tially yielded a four-factor solution, it was found from the scree 
plot and close comparisons of the structure and pattern matrices 
that a slightly lower eigenvalue cut-off (>0.9) provided a clearer 
  structure of the data (see Figure 1), with less noisy loadings on 
some of the variables, and strong loadings on the additional factor. 
The rotation for the ﬁ  nal ﬁ  ve-factor solution converged in eight 
iterations. For the ﬁ  nal solution, factor loadings below 0.2 were 
considered as noise, although weak loadings above 0.2 were taken 
into account. Factor interpretation was based on the strength 
and combination of variable loadings. The ﬁ  ve extracted com-
ponents showed no problematic intercorrelations (all correlation 
coefﬁ  cients ≤0.1).
Factor scores were calculated for each individual based on a 
regression model and correlated with the schizotypy subscales using 
Pearson’s r. Those factors signiﬁ  cantly correlated with schizotypy 
were entered into a single-step regression model as predictors of 
the related schizotypy subscale to assess the amount of variance in 
schizotypy traits that could be explained with the extracted factors. 
To compare our results with previous ﬁ  ndings, the unstandardised 
salience attribution measures derived from the SAT, and LIrr, were 
also correlated with the O-LIFE subscales.
RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHICS
One participant was excluded from analysis due to outlying values 
on several tests. The remaining 49 participants (23 male, 26 female) 
had a mean age of 24.80 years (SD = 7.03), and an average estimated 
IQ of 109.55 (SD = 4.32).
SCHIZOTYPY
Mean scores on the O-LIFE schizotypy scales were 1.41 (SD = 1.81) for 
Unusual Experiences, 2.86 (SD = 2.60) for Cognitive Disorganisation, 
1.12 (SD = 1.32) for Introvertive Anhedonia, and 2.14 (SD = 1.95) 
for Impulsive Nonconformity.
Component Number

















FIGURE 1 | Scree plot showing the eigenvalues of the ﬁ  ve extracted components and residual components.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 58  |  5
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BEHAVIOURAL TESTS
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and tests of difference for 
the behavioural variables of the cognitive test battery. Performance 
on all tests was similar to previous reports.
On the SAT, high-probability trials were rated as signiﬁ  cantly 
more likely to yield reward (mean = 64.82, SD = 19.97) relative to 
low-probability trials (mean = 16.45, SD = 13.03; Cohen’s d = 1.70), 
and  were  responded  to  faster  (mean = 227.26 ms,  SD = 27.45) 
than low-probability trials (mean = 240.47, SD = 30.07, Cohen’s 
d = 0.75).  A  signiﬁ   cant learned irrelevance effect was present 
on the LIrr (mean reaction times: R = 393.00 ms (SD = 47.87); 
PE = 377.35 ms (SD = 51.27); and NPE = 353.49 ms (SD = 61.83); 
Cohen’s d = 0.50). The median false alarm, premature, and miss 
rates were 3 (range: 0–22), 0 (range: 0–12), and 1 (range: 0–7), 
respectively. On the gambling task, participants chose the experi-
mental gamble signiﬁ  cantly more often when the probability of 
winning was high (mean  =  77.87, SD  =  13.65) relative to low 
(mean = 18.30, SD = 17.67; Cohen’s d = 2.48). The experimental 
gamble was chosen signiﬁ  cantly more often when potential wins 
were high (mean = 56.50, SD = 14.30) relative to low (mean = 39.67, 
SD = 1.43;  Cohen’s  d = 1.22),  and  signiﬁ  cantly less often when 
potential losses were high (mean = 36.86, SD = 1.90) relative to 
low (mean = 59.31, SD = 1.58; Cohen’s d = 1.68). On the PRL, par-
ticipants made signiﬁ  cantly fewer errors on Stage 1 (mean = 1.73 
errors, SD = 3.03) than on Stage 2 (mean = 7.69 errors, SD = 6.40; 
Cohen’s d = 1.05). On the AX-CPT, mean correct response latency 
was 279.71 ms (SD = 40.61), mean response rate to “AY” (“A” not fol-
lowed by “X”) trials was 15.45% (SD = 13.39), mean response rate to 
“BX” (“not A” followed by “X”) was 6.94% (SD = 6.91) and median 
response rate to “BY” (“not A” followed by “not X”) trials was 0 
(range: 0–5%). On the Digit Span, participants recalled signiﬁ  cantly 
more items on the forward stage (mean = 9.33, SD = 1.95) than the 
backwards stage (mean = 7.45, SD = 2.63; Cohen’s d = 0.91).
FACTOR ANALYSIS
Five factors were retained from the PCA, which are depicted with 
their variable loadings in Table 2. Overall, the factors accounted 
for 74.48% of the variance and were interpreted as reﬂ  ecting the 
Table 1 | Behavioural data. 
Test Measure  Mean  SD  t-value1  p-value
Salience attribution test  Implicit adaptive salience (ms)  13.21  17.67  5.23  <0.001
  Explicit adaptive salience (mm)  48.37  28.49  11.88  <0.001
  Implicit aberrant salience (ms)  15.64  12.18   
  Explicit aberrant salience (mm)  9.29  8.24   
Learned irrelevance  PE vs. NPE conditions (ms)  23.86  47.25  3.53  <0.001
Gambling task  Sensitivity to probability  59.57  24.01  17.37  <0.001
  Sensitivity to wins  16.84  13.78  8.55  <0.001
  Sensitivity to losses  −22.45 13.37  11.75  <0.001
Probabilistic reversal learning  Stage 1 vs. Stage 2 errors  5.96  5.70  7.24  <0.001
Continuous performance test  Hit rate to target (A–X, %)  94.86  4.05   
Working memory  Forward vs. backward digit span  1.88  2.06  6.39  <0.001
IQ Estimated  IQ  109.55  4.32   
1Degrees of freedom (df) = 48 for all tests, other than for PRL, where df = 47 due to a failure to understand instructions by one participant. Blank cells indicate that 
a test of difference was not applicable for the variable.
Table 2 | Pattern matrix. 
Components test   Operant/explicit   General cognitive   Contingency-based   Implicit aberrant   Attentional
variables learning  ability  speeding  salience  vigilance
Implicit adaptive salience      0.738  −0.346 
Implicit aberrant salience        −0.923 
Explicit adaptive salience  0.691 0.216  0.276    0.233
Explicit aberrant salience  −0.881 0.307     
Learned irrelevance      0.830 0.207 
Sensitivity to probability    0.797   0.285 
Hits to target, AX-CPT          0.968
Prob. reversal, stage 1 errors  −0.758      
Forward digit span  0.332  0.542    
IQ   0.814   −0.326 
Variance explained (%)  24.25  16.53  12.38  12.14  9.18
Loadings below 0.2 are not displayed. The matrix shows variable loadings on the ﬁ  ve extracted components.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 58  |  6
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following constructs: (1) Operant/explicit learning; (2) General 
 cognitive  ability; (3) Contingency-based speeding; (4) Implicit aber-
rant salience; and (5) Attentional vigilance.
We labelled the ﬁ  rst factor “Operant/explicit learning”, based on 
the strong negative loadings of explicit aberrant salience and Stage 1 
errors, and the strong positive loading of explicit adaptive salience. 
Digit span also loaded weakly onto this factor.
The second factor was labelled “General cognitive ability”, since 
high loadings consisted of the IQ, sensitivity to probability (from 
the gambling task), and the highest loading of the forward digit 
span. However, the explicit aberrant and adaptive salience measures 
also weakly loaded on this factor.
Contrary to our expectations, the third factor included high 
loadings of LIrr and the implicit measure of adaptive salience, as 
well as a weak residual loading of explicit adaptive salience. Based 
on the LIrr and implicit adaptive salience loadings, this factor was 
termed “Contingency-based speeding”.
Interestingly, the implicit aberrant salience measure loaded 
highly onto its own factor, and was therefore labelled “Implicit 
aberrant salience”. Some residual loadings were evident from 
the implicit adaptive salience measure, IQ, and sensitivity 
to probability.
The ﬁ  fth factor emerged independently with only one high load-
ing of the continuous performance measure and a weak residual 




As displayed in Table 3, the only signiﬁ  cant associations that emerged 
between the factor scores and the O−LIFE schizotypy subscales 
were negative correlations between Introvertive Anhedonia and 
the General cognitive ability factor, and the Introvertive Anhedonia 
subscale and the Implicit aberrant salience factor.
A single-step regression model with the General cognitive ability 
and Implicit aberrant salience factor scores as predictors explained 
approximately one-quarter of the variation in Introvertive 
Anhedonia scores (r2 = 0.252, p < 0.01; standardised betas = −0.415 
(p < 0.01), and −0.306 (p < 0.05), respectively).
Raw scores
Pearson’s r correlations between schizotypy and the unstandardised 
measures derived from the SAT and LIrr are presented in Table 4. The 
only signiﬁ  cant association that emerged was a positive correlation 
between Introvertive Anhedonia schizotypy score and implicit aber-
rant salience, replicating our previous ﬁ  nding (Roiser et al., 2009).
DISCUSSION
We used factor analysis to assess the construct validity of sali-
ence attribution measures derived from the SAT. In particular, the 
implicit aberrant salience measure was found to show excellent 
construct validity, and was independent from all other measures, 
including LIrr. However, LIrr and implicit adaptive salience loaded 
onto the same factor, which we interpret as reﬂ  ecting the ability to 
use informative stimuli to speed responses. The explicit aberrant 
and adaptive salience measures loaded primarily onto the same fac-
tor, which also included the Stage 1 errors measure from the PRL. 
The schizotypy trait of Introvertive Anhedonia showed moderate 
associations with the General cognitive ability and Implicit aber-
rant salience factors, as well as the raw implicit aberrant salience 
measure, the latter of which is consistent with our previous ﬁ  nding 
(Roiser et al., 2009). However, we were unable to replicate previ-
ously reported associations between explicit aberrant salience and 
schizotypy, or between LIrr and schizotypy. This may be in part due 
to the relatively low variance of schizotypy scores in our sample.
The SAT implicit aberrant salience measure loaded very strongly 
onto its own factor, which did not include LIrr. We therefore inter-
pret this factor as representing automatic salience misattribution, as 
Table 3 | Correlations between factor scores and schizotypy subscales.
  Operant/explicit   General cognitive   Contingency-based   Implicit aberrant   Attentional
 learning  ability  speeding  salience  vigilance
Unusual experiences  −0.25†  −0.12 0.01 −0.03  −0.16
Cognitive disorganisation  −0.03  −0.25†  −0.24  −0.02  −0.14
Introvertive anhedonia  0.07  −0.40** 0.09  −0.28*  −0.09
Impulsive nonconformity  0.07  −0.11  −0.05 0.27† 0.10
Pearson’s r-values are reported. **p < 0.01, *0.01 < p < 0.05, †0.05 < p < 0.1 (2-tailed).
Table 4 | Correlations between the salience and learned irrelevance variables, and schizotypy subscales.
  Implicit adaptive   Implicit aberrant   Explicit adaptive   Explicit aberrant   Learned
  salience salience salience salience irrelevance
Unusual experiences  0.05  0.03  −0.13 0.17  −0.06
Cognitive disorganisation  −0.04 0.07  −0.03  −0.12 0.01
Introvertive anhedonia  0.14  0.32*  −0.05  −0.13 0.04
Impulsive nonconformity  −0.17  −0.17 0.03  −0.19 0.07
*p < 0.05.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 58  |  7
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indexed by the inappropriate speeding of responses to one level 
of the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension, relative to the other. 
This result suggests that the implicit aberrant salience measure 
derived from the SAT is indeed a valid construct, and is not to 
any great extent confounded by other cognitive processes, at least 
those included in the present study. The weak loadings of IQ and 
sensitivity to probability on this factor point to a possible minor 
association between aberrant salience and general cognitive ability. 
The minor contribution of implicit adaptive salience to this fac-
tor most likely simply reﬂ  ects the use of a similar response format 
(reaction times) in the calculation of both measures. Importantly, 
the implicit aberrant salience factor, and the raw implicit aberrant 
salience measure, correlated signiﬁ  cantly with schizotypy, replicat-
ing our previous result and providing further evidence for the face 
validity of this measure.
The emergence of LIrr and implicit aberrant salience as inde-
pendent constructs is important in terms of understanding cogni-
tive deﬁ  cits in psychosis and schizophrenia. In contrast to previous 
suggestions (e.g. Gray, 2004), we speculate that different learning 
and attentional processes contribute to these constructs. While the 
mechanisms of both disrupted LI/LIrr and elevated aberrant sali-
ence are hypothesised to reﬂ  ect dopaminergic dysfunction, implicit 
aberrant salience may be more closely related to an impairment in 
the motivational aspects of reward learning. To put it another way, 
we suggest that the implicit aberrant salience measure represents 
the tendency to inappropriately and automatically tag irrelevant 
cues with importance or relevance, as Kapur (2003) hypothesised 
occurs in psychosis.
Since LIrr and aberrant salience were orthogonal in our dataset, 
it would appear that low scores on the measure of LIrr we employed 
do not necessarily reﬂ  ect impaired irrelevance attribution, or at 
least not in the same way that high scores on the SAT implicit aber-
rant salience measure do. Supporting this contention, other studies 
have suggested that LI/LIrr may rely not only on the attribution 
of irrelevance but also on switching (Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2003). 
Our data further clarify the interpretation of LIrr measures, since 
the implicit adaptive salience and LIrr measures jointly deﬁ  ned the 
factor we termed Contingency-based speeding. Both loaded highly in 
the same direction, indicating that the same process may underlie 
higher LIrr (more retardation of learning an association with a PE 
stimulus relative to a NPE stimulus) and higher adaptive salience 
(speeding of responses on high relative to low-probability reward 
trials). Both these measures reﬂ  ect changes in the speed at which 
participants respond in response to associative manipulations. Thus 
the Contingency-based speeding factor appears to reﬂ  ect either the 
successful learning of associations between stimuli, or possibly the 
extent to which responses are guided by such learning; it is difﬁ  cult 
to disambiguate between these two possibilities on the basis of the 
current dataset.
Either way, our data challenge the interpretation of LIrr as 
reﬂ  ecting solely the ability to attribute stimuli as irrelevant (Gal 
et al., 2005; Young et al., 2005). Moreover, schizotypy, which was 
associated with implicit aberrant salience, did not show a signiﬁ  -
cant relationship with LIrr. While this pattern of results might be 
interpreted as suggesting that aberrant salience is possibly be more 
relevant to psychosis than LI, therefore supporting the aberrant 
salience model over the comparator model, we feel that such a 
conclusion would be premature. Ours was a non-clinical sample 
with low variance in schizotypy, and further work is needed to 
determine whether aberrant salience and LI are similarly dissoci-
able in patients suffering from psychotic symptoms.
The emergence of the separate Operant/explicit learning factor 
suggests that implicit aberrant salience and LIrr are both dis-
tinct from the ability to form a conscious appraisal of stimulus-
 reinforcement associations. The explicit adaptive and the explicit 
aberrant salience measures loaded strongly onto this factor, in 
opposite directions. This factor also explained variance in the 
number of Stage 1 errors on the PRL. The three variables loading 
most highly onto this factor all tapped aspects of participants’ 
explicit knowledge of probabilistic stimulus-reinforcement asso-
ciations. However, the strong loadings of the explicit adaptive and 
aberrant salience measures on the same factor complicates the 
interpretation of our previous ﬁ  ndings (Roiser et al., 2009), where 
delusions were associated with explicit aberrant salience, but not 
with explicit adaptive salience, in patients with schizophrenia. 
One possible reason for this strong joint loading is that partici-
pants who did not learn any stimulus-reinforcement associations 
might simply respond randomly on the VAS. Such individuals 
would be expected to exhibit low scores (perhaps even negative) 
on the explicit adaptive salience measure, but higher (non-zero) 
on the explicit aberrant salience measure. This is because the lat-
ter measure is calculated using absolute scores, and will therefore 
detect any variability in ratings on the task-irrelevant dimen-
sion, random or otherwise. One strategy would be to exclude 
participants who did not show at least some explicit adaptive 
salience, and especially those exhibiting high explicit aberrant 
salience ratings, to attempt to exclude variability simply related 
to random responding. Unfortunately, we did not have a suf-
ﬁ  ciently large enough sample in the present study to make this 
strategy viable.
The General cognitive ability factor explained the sensitivity 
to probability measure and estimated IQ very clearly. It also best 
accounted for variance in forwards digit span, although this meas-
ure also showed medium loadings on other constructs, notably the 
Operant/explicit learning factor. Thus it appears that sensitivity to 
probability, as assessed by the decision-making task, is independ-
ent from probabilistic learning, as assessed by the SAT and PRL. 
Interestingly, the General cognitive ability factor was moderately 
associated with Introvertive Anhedonia schizotypy, in fact more 
strongly than was the Implicit aberrant salience factor. There was 
also a trend towards an association with Cognitive Disorganisation 
schizotypy. These associations may reﬂ  ect the general cognitive 
impairment commonly reported in schizophrenia and high-
 schizotypy  individuals.
The factor of Attentional vigilance appeared to be a direct reﬂ  ec-
tion of the ability to maintain contextual information and apply it to 
guide responses, with nearly no residual variance of the proportion 
of hits to “AX” remaining unexplained. However, it is   important 
to note that with the initial four-factor solution, this attentional 
measure was distributed across the other four factors with weak to 
medium loadings, suggesting that rather than being strongly related 
to any particular variable included, attentional vigilance appears to 
be implicated to some extent in most of the constructs described 
when it is not treated as a construct in its own right.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 58  |  8
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In fact, most measures included in the factor analysis showed 
weak residual loadings, indicating that many cognitive variables 
are impossible to fully dissociate from each other. For example, 
while the measures derived from the SAT show good validity based 
on the current analysis, some maintenance of working memory 
capacity is logically necessary to accurately report probabilistic 
associations using VAS, supported by a weak residual loading 
of explicit SAT measures on the Operant/explicit learning factor. 
Crucially, the General cognitive ability and the Attentional vigilance 
factors were clearly dissociable from those explaining variance 
on SAT measures, suggesting that the SAT provides valid meas-
ures of salience attribution largely unconfounded by attention, 
working memory or IQ. Thus while other cognitive processes 
are clearly necessary to complete the SAT, it appears that these 
processes can be dissociated sufﬁ  ciently to detect aberrant sali-
ence attribution independent of any generalised cognitive deﬁ  cit 
(Murray et al., 2008a also raise this point with regards to incentive 
motivation processes).
We were unable to replicate an association between schizotypy 
and explicit aberrant salience; neither was schizotypy associated 
with either of the adaptive salience measures (Roiser et al., 2009). 
The reason for this failure to replicate is not clear, but may be 
related to the sample characteristics. The variability in schizotypy 
in our sample was relatively low, likely reﬂ  ecting the recruitment 
methods employed and stringent screening criteria (compare, for 
example, with Shrira and Tsakanikos, 2009). However, it is notable 
that, while not statistically signiﬁ  cant, there was a trend towards 
an association between the Operant/explicit learning factor and 
Unusual Experiences schizotypy, though whether this reﬂ  ects an 
association with explicit adaptive or aberrant salience is unclear. 
Future studies in healthy volunteers may consider pre-selecting 
participants on the basis of schizotypy in order to avoid such inter-
pretative difﬁ  culties.
A weakness of our analysis was that two of the factors were 
interpreted based on a strong loading of only a single variable each 
(Implicit aberrant salience and Attentional vigilance). This is not 
ideal in a PCA, which sets out to reduce the constructs based on 
shared variance, thus requiring loadings of several items to accept 
latent variables as valid constructs. However, these factors could be 
interpreted clearly, since the variables entered into the PCA were 
secondary (construct) variables based on previously validated para-
digms, which yielded similar effect sizes to those reported elsewhere 
in the literature.
In summary, we found that the SAT can dissociate implicit 
aberrant salience processing from other aspects of reward learn-
ing and attention, in particular LIrr. Furthermore, mechanisms 
of LIrr and adaptive salience attribution appear to be associated, 
but both were largely independent from other cognitive processes, 
including attentional vigilance and working memory. We replicated 
an association between implicit aberrant salience and Introvertive 
Anhedonia schizotypy in healthy volunteers, but we could not 
replicate previously reported associations between schizotypy 
and explicit aberrant salience or LIrr. These data support the use 
of aberrant salience, particularly the implicit measure, as a valid 
construct in future studies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Robert D. Rogers providing the Choice × Risk gam-
bling task and Luke Clark for providing the Probabilistic Reversal 
Learning task.
REFERENCES
Baruch, I., Hemsley, D. R., and Gray, J. A. 
(1988). Differential performance of 
acute and chronic schizophrenics in 
a latent inhibition task. J. Nerv. Ment. 
Dis. 176, 598–606.
Bedwell, J. S., Kamath, V., and Compton, 
M. T. (2009). The relationship between 
interview-based schizotypal personal-
ity dimension scores and the continu-
ous performance test. Schizophr. Res. 
108, 158–162.
Berridge, K. C., and Robinson, T. E. 
(1998). What is the role of dopamine 
in reward: hedonic impact, reward 
learning, or incentive salience? Brain 
Res. Brain Res. Rev. 28, 309–369.
Braunstein-Bercovitz, H. (2003). The 
modulation of latent inhibition by 
ﬁ  eld-dependency: is it related to atten-
tional dysfunction in schizotypy? Pers. 
Individ. Dif. 35, 1719–1729.
Braunstein-Bercovitz, H., and Lubow, R. 
E. (1998). Are high-schizotypal nor-
mal participants distractible or limited 
in attentional resources? A study of 
latent inhibition as a function of mask-
ing task load and   schizotypy level. J. 
Abnorm. Psychol. 107, 659–670.
Claridge, G. (1994). Single indicator of 
risk for schizophrenia: probable fact 
or likely myth? Schizophr. Bull. 20, 
151–168.
Cohen, J. D., Barch, D. M., Carter, C., and 
Servan-Schreiber, D. (1999). Context-
processing deﬁ  cits in schizophrenia: 
converging evidence from three theo-
retically motivated cognitive tasks. J. 
Abnorm. Psychol. 108, 120–133.
Corlett, P. R., Honey, G. D., and Fletcher, P. 
C. (2007). From prediction error to psy-
chosis: ketamine as a pharmacological 
model of delusions. J. Psychopharmacol. 
(Oxford) 21, 238–252.
De la Casa, L. G., Ruiz, G., and Lubow, R. 
E. (1993). Amphetamine-  produced 
attenuation of latent inhibition 
is modulated by stimulus preex-
posure duration: implications for 
schizophrenia. Biol. Psychiatry 33, 
707–711.
Gal, G., Mendlovic, S., Bloch, Y., Beitler, G., 
Levkovitz, Y., Young, A. M., Feldon, J., 
and Ratzoni, G. (2005). Learned irrel-
evance is disrupted in ﬁ  rst-episode but 
not chronic schizophrenia patients. 
Behav. Brain Res. 159, 267–275.
Gold, J. M., Waltz, J. A., Prentice, K. J., 
Morris, S. E., and Heerey, E. A. (2008). 
Reward processing in schizophrenia: a 
deﬁ  cit in the representation of value. 
Schizophr. Bull. 34, 835–847.
Gray, J. A. (1998). Integrating Schizo-
phrenia.  Schizophr. Bull. 24, 
249–266.
Gray, J. A. (2004). [Letter to the Editor.]. 
Am. J. Psychiatry 161, 377.
Gray, J. A., Feldon, J., Rawlins, J. N. R., 
Hemsley, D. R., and Smith, A. D. (1991). 
The neuropsychology of schizophre-
nia. Behav. Brain Res. 14, 1–20.
Gray, N. S., Fernandez, M., Williams, 
J., Ruddle, R. A., and Snowden, R. J. 
(2002). Which schizotypal dimensions 
abolish latent inhibition? Br. J. Clin. 
Psychol. 41, 271–284.
Gray, N. S., Pilowsky, L. S., Gray, J. A., and 
Kerwin, R. W. (1995). Latent inhibi-
tion in drug naive schizophrenics: 
relationship to duration of illness 
and dopamine D2 binding using SPET. 
Schizophr. Res. 17, 95–107.
Heerey, E. A., Bell-Warren, K. R., and 
Gold, J. M. (2008). Decision-making 
impairments in the context of intact 
reward sensitivity in schizophrenia. 
Biol. Psychiatry 64, 62–69.
Hemsley, D. R. (1993). A simple (or 
simplistic?) cognitive model for 
schizophrenia. Behav. Res. Ther. 31, 
633–645.
Horvitz, J. C. (2000). Mesolimbocortical 
and nigrostriatal dopamine responses 
to salient non-reward events. 
Neuroscience 96, 651–656.
Jensen, J., and Kapur, S. (2009). Salience 
and psychosis: moving from theory to 
practise. Psychol. Med. 39, 197–198.
Jensen, J., Willeit, M., Zipursky, R. B., 
Savina, I., Smith, A. J., Menon, M., 
Crawley, A. P., and Kapur, S. (2008). The 
formation of abnormal associations in 
schizophrenia: neural and behavioral 
evidence. Neuropsychopharmacology 
33, 473–479.
Jones, S. H., Gray, J. A., and Hemsley, D. 
R. (1992). Loss of the Kamin blocking 
effect in acute but not chronic schizo-
phrenics. Biol. Psychol. 32, 739–755.
Kapur, S. (2003). Psychosis as a state of 
aberrant salience: a framework link-
ing biology, phenomenology, and 
pharmacology in schizophrenia. Am. 
J. Psychiatry 160, 13–23.
Keri, S., Kelemen, O., Szekeres, G., 
Bagoczky, N., Erdelyi, R., Antal, A., 
Benedek, G., and Janka, Z. (2000). 
Schizophrenics know more than they 
can tell: probabilistic classification 
learning in schizophrenia. Psychol. 
Med. 30, 149–155.
Laruelle, M., and Abi-Dargham, A. (1999). 
Dopamine as the wind of the psychotic 
ﬁ  re: new evidence from brain imaging Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 58  |  9
Schmidt and Roiser  Aberrant salience – construct validity
studies. J. Psychopharmacol. (Oxford) 
13, 358–371.
Lubow, R. E., and De la Casa, G. (2002). 
Latent inhibition as a function of 
schizotypality and gender: implica-
tions for schizophrenia. Biol. Psychol. 
59, 69–86.
Maher, B. A. (1974). Delusional thinking 
and perceptual disorder. J. Individ. 
Psychol. 30, 98–113.
Mason, O., Linney, Y., and Claridge, G. 
(2005). Short scales for   measuring 
schizotypy.  Schizophr. Res. 78, 
293–296.
Miller, R. (1976). Schizophrenic psychol-
ogy, associative learning and the role of 
forebrain dopamine. Med. Hypotheses 
2, 203–211.
Murray, G. K., Clark, L., Corlett, P. R., 
Blackwell, A. D., Cools, R., Jones, P. 
B., Robbins, T. W., and Poustka, L. 
(2008a). Incentive motivation in ﬁ  rst-
episode psychosis: a behavioural study. 
BMC Psychiatry 8, 34.
Murray, G. K., Corlett, P. R., Clark, L., 
Pessiglione, M., Blackwell, A. D., 
Honey, G., Jones, P. B., Bullmore, E. 
T., Robbins, T. W., and Fletcher, P. 
C. (2008b). Substantia nigra/ventral 
tegmental reward prediction error dis-
ruption in psychosis. Mol. Psychiatry 
13, 239, 267–276.
Orosz, A. T., Feldon, J., Gal, G., Simon, A. 
E., and Cattapan-Ludewig, K. (2008). 
Deﬁ  cient associative learning in drug-
naive first-episode schizophrenia: 
results obtained using a new visual 
within-subjects learned irrelevance 
paradigm. Behav. Brain Res. 193, 
101–107.
Robbins, T. W. (2005). Synthesizing schiz-
ophrenia: a bottom-up,   symptomatic 
approach.  Schizophr. Bull. 31, 
854–864.
Rogers, R. D., Blackshaw, A. J., Middleton, 
H. C., Matthews, K., Hawtin, K., 
Crowley, C., Hopwood, A., Wallace, 
C., Deakin, J. F., Sahakian, B. J., and 
Robbins, T. W. (1999). Tryptophan 
depletion impairs stimulus-reward 
learning while methylphenidate dis-
rupts attentional control in healthy 
young adults: implications for the 
monoaminergic basis of impulsive 
behaviour. Psychopharmacology (Berl.) 
146, 482–491.
Rogers, R. D., Tunbridge, E. M., 
Bhagwagar, Z., Drevets, W. C., 
Sahakian, B. J., and Carter, C. S. (2003). 
Tryptophan depletion alters the 
 decision-making of healthy volunteers 
through altered processing of reward 
cues. Neuropsychopharmacology 28, 
153–162.
Roiser, J. P., Stephan, K. E., den Ouden, 
H. E., Barnes, T. R., Friston, K. J., and 
Joyce, E. M. (2009). Do patients with 
schizophrenia exhibit aberrant sali-
ence? Psychol. Med. 39, 199–209.
Schmidt-Hansen, M., Killcross, A. S., and 
Honey, R. C. (2009). Latent inhibition, 
learned irrelevance, and schizotypy: 
assessing their relationship. Cogn. 
Neuropsychiatry 14, 11–29.
Seeman, P., and Kapur, S. (2000). 
Schizophrenia: more dopamine, 
more D2 receptors. Proc. Natl. Acad. 
Sci. U.S.A. 97, 7673–7675.
Shaner, A. (1999). Delusions, superstitious 
conditioning and chaotic dopamine 
neurodynamics. Med. Hypotheses 53, 
119–123.
Sheehan, D. V., Lecrubier, Y., Sheehan, K. 
H., Amorim, P., Janavs, J., Weiller, E., 
Hergueta, T., Baker, R., and Dunbar, 
G. C. (1998). The Mini-International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.): 
the development and validation of a 
structured diagnostic psychiatric 
interview for DSM-IV and ICD-10. 
J. Clin. Psychiatry 59(Suppl 20), 
22–33;quiz 34–57.
Shrira, A., and Tsakanikos, E. (2009). 
Latent inhibition as a function of 
positive and negative   schizotypal 
symptoms: evidence for a bi-
directional model. Pers. Individ. Dif. 
47, 434–438.
Solomon, P. R., Crider, A., Winkelman, J. 
W., Turi, A., Kamer, R. M., and Kaplan, 
L. J. (1981). Disrupted latent inhibition 
in the rat with chronic amphetamine 
or haloperidol-induced supersensi-
tivity: Relationship to schizophrenic 
attention disorder. Biol. Psychol. 16, 
519–537.
Swainson, R., Rogers, R. D., Sahakian, B. 
J., Summers, B. A., Polkey, C. E., and 
Robbins, T. W. (2000). Probabilistic 
learning and reversal deﬁ  cits in patients 
with Parkinson’s disease or frontal or 
temporal lobe lesions: possible adverse 
effects of dopaminergic medication. 
Neuropsychologia 38, 596–612.
Vaitl, D., Lipp, O., Bauer, U., Schuler, 
G., Stark, R., Zimmermann, M., and 
Kirsch, P. (2002). Latent inhibition and 
schizophrenia: Pavlovian condition-
ing of autonomic responses. Schizophr. 
Res. 55, 147–158.
Verdoux, H., and van Os, J. (2002). 
Psychotic symptoms in non-clinical 
populations and the continuum of 
psychosis. Schizophr. Res. 54, 59–65.
Waltz, J. A., and Gold, J. M. (2007). 
Probabilistic reversal learning impair-
ments in schizophrenia: further evi-
dence of orbitofrontal dysfunction. 
Schizophr. Res. 93, 296–303.
Waltz, J. A., Schweitzer, J. B., Gold, J. M., 
Kurup, P. K., Ross, T. J., Salmeron, B. J., 
Rose, E. J., McClure, S. M., and Stein, E. 
A. (2009). Patients with schizophrenia 
have a reduced neural response to both 
unpredictable and predictable primary 
reinforcers. Neuropsychopharmacology 
34, 1567–1577.
Wechsler D. (1981). Manual for 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale-Revised. New York, NY, The 
Psychological Corporation.
Wechsler, D. (2001). Wechsler Test of 
Adult Reading manual. San Antonio, 
TX, The Psychological Corporation.
Weiner, I., Lubow, R. E., and Feldon, J. 
(1981). Chronic amphetamine and 
latent inhibition. Behav. Brain Res. 2, 
285–286.
Weiner, I., Lubow, R. E., and Feldon, J. 
(1984). Abolition of the expression 
but not the acquisition of latent inhibi-
tion by chronic amphetamine in rats. 
Psychopharmocology 83, 194–199.
Weiner, I., Lubow, R. E., and Feldon, J. 
(1988). Disruption of latent inhibition 
by acute administration of low doses 
of amphetamine. Pharmacol. Biochem. 
Behav. 30, 871–878.
Young, A. M., Kumari, V., Mehrotra, R., 
Hemsley, D. R., Andrew, C., Sharma, T., 
Williams, S. C., and Gray, J. A. (2005). 
Disruption of learned irrelevance in 
acute schizophrenia in a novel con-
tinuous within-subject paradigm 
suitable for fMRI. Behav. Brain Res. 
156, 277–288.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The 
authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or 
ﬁ  nancial relationships that could be con-
strued as a potential conﬂ  ict of interest.
Received: 29 September 2009; paper pend-
ing published: 05 November 2009; accepted: 
03 December 2009; published online: 23 
December 2009.
Citation: Schmidt K and Roiser JP (2009) 
Assessing the construct validity of aberrant 
salience. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 3:58. doi: 
10.3389/neuro.08.058.2009
Copyright © 2009 Schmidt and Roiser. This is 
an open-access article subject to an exclusive 
license agreement between the authors and 
the Frontiers Research Foundation, which 
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original authors and source are credited.